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Local Government Adaptability in Hydrometeorological Disaster Management: A Dynamic Capabilities Analysis of Jeneponto Regency, Indonesia

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Abstract: *Hydrometeorological hazards in Jeneponto Regency require local governments to adapt institutional capacity to floods, landslides, drought, and compound events. This study examines local-government adaptability through integrating, building, and reconfiguring capabilities. It adopts a qualitative documentary case-study design based exclusively on regulations, disaster-management plans, government reports, technical records, and disaster-event records covering 2019–2026; no interviews or field observations were conducted. Institutional documents were coded deductively using the three capabilities and compared across hazard types and periods. Academic publications provided contextual and theoretical support rather than primary evidence of institutional action. The documentary analysis suggests that integration is most visible during emergency mobilization, while connections across prevention and sectoral services remain uneven. Building capability is reflected in formal arrangements and response experience, although the available records provide limited evidence of cumulative learning and transferable routines. Reconfiguration appears in temporary adjustments to personnel, logistics, and command, with continuing reliance on ad hoc arrangements. Differences in disaster outcomes are interpreted cautiously because hazard characteristics and exposure also vary. Drawing on these institutional records, the study proposes a conceptual adaptive disaster-governance cycle linking risk sensing, collective interpretation, proportional integration, rapid reconfiguration, and accountability-based learning. The cycle is an analytical proposition requiring field-based validation, rather than an empirically verified account of decision-making processes.*

INTRODUCTION

Hydrometeorological disasters are not governed by a fixed operational problem. Their intensity, location, duration, and social consequences change with rainfall patterns, river-basin conditions, land-use conversion, environmental degradation, and the distribution of vulnerable populations. For local governments, the challenge is therefore not limited to possessing plans, personnel, equipment, and budgets. It also involves the ability to continually adjust how these resources are combined and used when the character of risk changes. Disaster governance becomes an institutional test of whether public organizations can maintain accountability while acting with sufficient speed, flexibility, and contextual sensitivity (Comfort, 2007; Tierney, 2012).

The Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030 places disaster-risk governance, preparedness, institutional capacity, and learning among the central priorities for reducing losses (UNDRR, 2015). In Indonesia, this orientation is reflected in the National Disaster Management Plan 2020–2024 and in the legal assignment of disaster management as a mandatory public-service responsibility of national and local governments (BNPB, 2020; Republic of Indonesia, 2007, 2014). These arrangements establish a strong formal architecture. However, formal authority does not automatically generate adaptive performance. Local agencies may possess standard operating procedures and emergency structures but still struggle to integrate fragmented information, mobilize resources across sectoral boundaries, or revise routines when events diverge from previously anticipated scenarios.

Jeneponto Regency in South Sulawesi provides a relevant setting for examining this institutional problem. Its mountain, hill, lowland, and coastal zones expose communities to flash floods, river floods, landslides, drought, and extreme weather. A spatial study of the Rumbia–Kelara area found that 63.21% of the study area was classified as highly vulnerable to hydrometeorological hazards, particularly because soil characteristics and surface runoff amplify risk during intense rainfall (Ahmad et al., 2022). The administrative implications are substantial because hazards cross organizational jurisdictions: flood response requires disaster management, public works, social affairs, health, transportation, and village administration; drought additionally requires water services, agriculture, food security, and longer-term livelihood protection; degradation in upstream areas requires environmental governance and enforcement.

The sequence of events recorded between 2019 and 2026 illustrates a moving risk environment. A major flash flood in 2019 caused extensive housing and infrastructure damage and significant loss of life, while an extreme drought in the same year affected access to clean water. Compound flooding and landslides in Rumbia in 2020 disrupted an inter-regency transport corridor. Flooding in Tarowang in 2021 affected more than a thousand residents with no recorded fatalities; this outcome alone does not establish improved evacuation performance. Fatal landslides returned in 2022, followed by severe drought impacts in 2023–2024, another flash flood in 2025 involving large woody debris from upstream areas, and transport and village-access disruption from floods and landslides in 2026 (BPBD Jeneponto, 2019–2026). The variation among these events means that a single operational routine cannot provide an adequate response across all conditions.

Studies of disaster management repeatedly show that local capacity depends on more than legal mandates or physical resources. Effective disaster-risk management requires strategic, financial, organizational, collaborative, and communication capacity (Cvetković et al., 2021). Emergency management also depends on horizontal and vertical networks because knowledge, authority, personnel, logistics, and technical assets are distributed across organizations (Kapucu and Garayev, 2016). Collaboration can improve emergency performance, but its effects are conditioned by institutional arrangements and the ability of organizations to absorb information and alter their behavior (Liu and Fan, 2023). These findings point to the importance of examining not only what capacity a local government has, but how it changes the configuration of that capacity.

Dynamic capabilities theory offers an analytical basis for this purpose. The theory was initially developed to explain how organizations integrate, build, and reconfigure internal and external competencies in rapidly changing environments (Teece et al., 1997; Teece, 2007). In public organizations, the concept must be separated from its original concern with competitive advantage. The relevant outcome is not market performance, but the continued production of public value, the protection of citizens, the continuity of essential services, and the legitimate exercise of authority under uncertainty. Research in public-sector settings suggests that dynamic capabilities are enabled by experimentation, learning, knowledge management, innovation, collaboration, and information technology (Pablo et al., 2007; Loureiro et al., 2021). In emergency management, they help explain why similar formal structures can produce different levels of responsiveness when events evolve rapidly.

This article uses three closely connected capabilities derived from the dynamic capabilities perspective. Integrating capability refers to the ability to combine information, authority, actors, and resources that are institutionally dispersed. Building capability refers to the development of routines, competencies, procedures, networks, and institutional memory that expand the organization's future response options. Reconfiguring capability refers to the ability to realign structures, roles, resource allocations, and operating procedures when existing arrangements no longer match the situation. These capabilities are analytically distinct but mutually dependent: integration without learning remains temporary, building without reconfiguration can produce additional rigidity, and reconfiguration without integration can undermine coordination and accountability.

The existing literature has increasingly applied dynamic capabilities to public organizations, humanitarian operations, and emergency collaboration (Son et al., 2025; Liu and Fan, 2023). Yet local disaster studies in Indonesia more commonly emphasize implementation, coordination, collaboration, or institutional capacity as relatively stable conditions. Less attention is given to how local governments transform available capacity across a sequence of different hazards. This gap is important in multi-hazard regions because effectiveness cannot be assessed only through one emergency episode. It must also be evaluated through the extent to which experience accumulates, cross-sectoral arrangements become more reliable, and resources can be redirected without waiting for ad hoc improvisation.

Accordingly, this study asks: how is the adaptability of the Jeneponto Regency Government manifested through its ability to integrate, build, and reconfigure institutional capacity for hydrometeorological disaster management? The article aims to identify the pattern and limitations of each capability and to formulate an adaptive governance cycle suitable for local public administration. Its contribution is twofold. Empirically, it interprets a sequence of different hydrometeorological events rather than treating disasters as isolated cases. Theoretically, it translates dynamic capabilities into institutionalized flexibility: a capacity to adjust action while preserving public accountability, inter-organizational coherence, and continuity of service.

RESEARCH METHODS

This study employed a qualitative documentary case-study design. Documentary analysis was selected because the research question concerns institutional change across multiple disaster events and because the relevant evidence is distributed across regulations, plans, annual reports, event records, spatial studies, and administrative documents. Documents are not treated merely as background information; they are analyzed as institutional records that reveal how problems are defined, which actors are authorized, how resources are organized, and whether lessons from earlier events are incorporated into later arrangements (Bowen, 2009). The case is bounded geographically by Jeneponto Regency and temporally by the 2019–2026 sequence of hydrometeorological events.

The empirical corpus comprised institutional documents selected purposively for their relevance to disaster-management responsibilities and actions in Jeneponto Regency: (1) Law No. 24/2007 on Disaster Management and Law No. 23/2014 on Local Government; (2) the National Disaster Management Plan 2020–2024 and related BNPB planning instruments; (3) annual and event-based records compiled by the Jeneponto Regency Disaster Management Agency for 2019–2026; (4) provincial spatial-vulnerability information and government reports on drought, flooding, and landslides; and (5) technical records concerning impact-based early warning and transport-infrastructure disruption. These institutional records constituted the documentary evidence subjected to capability coding. Academic publications on the Rumbia–Kelara hazard context, disaster governance, local capacity, and dynamic capabilities were used separately to establish contextual and theoretical foundations and to interpret the findings; they were not treated as primary institutional records or coded as evidence of local-government action.

Analysis followed an interactive process of data condensation, display, and conclusion drawing (Miles et al., 2014). First, each document was reviewed to identify references to actors, information flows, formal authority, operational procedures, resources, coordination mechanisms, learning practices, and adjustments during emergencies. Second, the evidence was coded deductively under integrating, building, and reconfiguring capability. Inductive subcodes were added when recurring patterns appeared, including event-driven coordination, sectoral fragmentation, uneven institutional memory, temporary resource mobilization, and hazard-specific adaptation. Third, an event-by-capability matrix was used to compare the operation of each capability across floods, landslides, drought, and compound events. The comparison focused on patterns rather than on attributing causal weight to a single document.

Credibility was strengthened through source triangulation. Statements in planning and regulatory documents were compared with event records and with academic risk studies. The analysis also distinguished formal capacity from demonstrated capacity. A mandate, committee, information system, or procedure was coded as formal capacity; it was treated as demonstrated

adaptive capability only when documentary evidence indicated that it supported integration, learning, or reconfiguration in a concrete disaster context. Because this study relies on documents, it does not claim to replace field-based accounts of frontline discretion, political negotiation, or community experience. Instead, it provides an institutional diagnosis and an analytical basis for subsequent interviews, observations, and comparative event analysis.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

A changing hazard environment and the limits of static capacity

The event sequence indicates that Jeneponto's institutional problem is not simply a shortage of capacity. It is a mismatch between capacity configurations and the changing requirements of different hazards. Flood and flash-flood emergencies demand rapid warning, evacuation, rescue, shelter, and infrastructure clearance. Landslides require access management, geotechnical information, search and rescue, and protection of transport corridors. Drought requires sustained water distribution, agricultural protection, health and sanitation services, and coordination over a longer time horizon. Upstream environmental degradation expands the required network further by connecting emergency response with land management and enforcement. Thus, the same actors and resources cannot be combined in the same way for every event.

Table 1 summarizes the event sequence and the adaptive-capability questions raised by the documented impacts and response patterns. These implications are analytical propositions rather than established causal explanations. In particular, the absence of recorded fatalities in the 2021 Tarowang flood and the fatalities reported in the 2022 Rumbia landslide cannot, by themselves, establish either improved institutional performance or a failure to transfer capabilities. The events differ in hazard type and location, and the documentary comparison does not control for hazard intensity, speed of onset, warning lead time, exposure, terrain, or evacuation access. Institutional factors, including coordination, preparedness, and learning, must therefore be distinguished from hazard characteristics and local exposure conditions. Whether lessons from one event informed arrangements for another remains a question for further investigation through evidence of procedural changes, training, resource allocation, and operational decisions.

TABLE 1. HYDROMETEOROLOGICAL EVENTS AND ADAPTIVE-CAPABILITY IMPLICATIONS IN JENEPONTO, 2019–2026

Year	Hazard pattern	Documented impact	Adaptive implication
2019	Flash flood and extreme drought	Extensive housing and infrastructure damage; fatalities and missing persons; clean-water crisis	Need to connect emergency response, river-basin risk, water services, and long-term recovery
2020	Compound flash flood and landslide	Inter-regency road disruption and fatalities in Rumbia	Need for joint command, access management, and cross-hazard operational planning
2021	Flash flood	317 households / 1,292 residents affected; no fatalities	Need to assess evacuation arrangements and cross-hazard learning alongside hazard and exposure conditions
2022	Landslide	Fatalities and disrupted access in Rumbia	Need to build location-specific mitigation and convert prior lessons into preventive routines
2023–2024	Extreme drought	Water scarcity and agricultural losses	Need to reconfigure from short emergency response to sustained multi-sector service delivery
2025	Flash flood with upstream debris	Residents trapped; high destructive potential	Need to integrate disaster governance with upstream environmental management
2026	Flooding and landslides	Transport and village-access disruption	Need for rapid resource realignment and protection of critical infrastructure

Source: Author's documentary compilation based on BPBD Jeneponto records and supporting government documents, 2019–2026.

Integrating capability: strong emergency mobilization, weak cross-cycle integration

Integrating capability concerns the combination of distributed resources and authority. Jeneponto's formal disaster-management arrangements provide a lead role for BPBD, while operational response necessarily involves public works, social affairs, health, transportation, the police and military, search-and-rescue organizations, subdistrict and village governments,

volunteers, and community actors. Documentary evidence indicates that this integration can be activated during emergencies. The evacuation outcome in the 2021 Tarowang flood and the rescue of trapped residents in the 2025 Bontotiro event show that multi-actor mobilization is possible when an immediate threat is visible and command priorities are clear.

However, integration appears more event-driven than cycle-wide. The formal network expands rapidly during response but is less coherent in prevention, mitigation, and long-duration adaptation. Flood warnings and emergency information must pass through institutional channels before becoming decisions on evacuation, road closure, logistics, and public communication. Where sectoral data remain separated, the presence of an early-warning system does not guarantee a synchronized action. Comfort (2007) emphasizes that cognition, communication, coordination, and control must operate as an interdependent system; weakness in one element delays the conversion of information into collective action.

The problem becomes more pronounced when the hazard shifts. Drought management requires actors and resource combinations different from those used for flash floods. Agricultural agencies, water utilities, village governments, health services, and social-protection programs become central, while the response period extends beyond the short emergency phase. Likewise, woody debris in the 2025 flood connects response capacity with environmental monitoring and upstream land governance. If integration is organized only around a conventional emergency-command roster, it will not adequately address these cross-sectoral drivers.

Network research helps explain this limitation. Emergency management requires both vertical links to provincial and national authorities and horizontal links across local agencies and non-state actors (Kapucu and Garayev, 2016). Yet a larger network does not automatically produce better performance. Clear task allocation, interoperable information, mutual expectations, and a recognized coordination point are required. Liu and Fan (2023) similarly show that collaboration performance depends on institutional arrangements and dynamic capability. In Jeneponto, the analytical issue is therefore not the absence of actors, but whether their resources can be deliberately integrated before an event rather than assembled after the situation becomes critical.

Strengthening integrating capability requires a common risk picture that combines meteorological information, hydrological conditions, vulnerable-population data, road access, logistics, water availability, agricultural exposure, and upstream environmental indicators. It also requires pre-agreed protocols specifying which agency leads under different hazard configurations and what operational thresholds trigger joint action. This shifts coordination from general statements of cooperation toward a usable architecture for shared decisions.

Building capability: formal architecture without cumulative institutionalization

Building capability refers to the development of assets that improve future action: trained personnel, reliable routines, joint protocols, information systems, equipment, partnerships, and institutional memory. Jeneponto is not starting from an institutional vacuum. National and local mandates establish disaster-management responsibilities, and local response experience offers opportunities for practical learning. The absence of recorded fatalities in the 2021 flood is consistent with effective evacuation, but this outcome alone cannot establish that institutional capacity improved or identify the contribution of preparedness and inter-agency mobilization.

The key question is whether lessons from response experience accumulate and become transferable across hazards. Recurrent fatalities and disruption in later events justify examining this question, but do not independently demonstrate a failure of institutional learning because hazard characteristics and exposure conditions also vary. The documentary analysis therefore treats uneven institutionalization of learning as an interpretation requiring further verification through records of procedural revision, training, and knowledge sharing. Staff rotation, fragmented documentation, irregular after-action review, and limited cross-agency dissemination are potential barriers rather than established explanations in this case. Moynihan and Landuyt (2009) distinguish between individual learning and organizational structures that support learning; the latter require routines that preserve and redistribute knowledge.

Dynamic capabilities literature emphasizes that building is not equivalent to simply adding resources. It concerns the formation and renewal of competencies that can be recombined later (Helfat and Peteraf, 2003). For a local government, this means developing modular capabilities: trained teams that can work across hazard types, shared data standards, scenario-based contingency plans, mutual-aid arrangements, accessible inventories, and cross-agency exercises. Such capabilities expand the range of feasible responses without prescribing one fixed solution.

The documentary pattern also shows the importance of linking operational learning to structural prevention. A flood that carries debris from upstream areas should not be treated only as a logistics and rescue episode. It should produce a joint review involving environmental management, spatial planning, infrastructure, village administration, and enforcement. Similarly, recurring road disruption should inform critical-infrastructure protection, alternative access planning, and pre-positioning decisions. Building capability therefore requires after-action mechanisms that connect the immediate response with budgeting, planning, environmental governance, and service standards.

Public-sector research supports this interpretation. Pablo et al. (2007) found that experimentation and learning can enable dynamic capabilities in government, while Loureiro et al. (2021) identify knowledge, learning, innovation, and information technology as central dimensions of dynamic capabilities in public organizations. The practical implication is that Jeneponto's capability-building agenda should be measured not only by the number of trainings or documents produced, but by whether recurrent problems are converted into revised routines, budgets, responsibilities, and interoperable systems.

Reconfiguring capability: episodic improvisation rather than routinized flexibility

Reconfiguring capability is the most demanding dimension because it requires institutions to change how they operate while an event is evolving. It includes reallocating personnel and logistics, modifying command relationships, activating alternative communication channels, changing service-delivery priorities, and relaxing routine sequences without abandoning legality and accountability. In disaster settings, the relevant question is not whether procedures exist, but whether authorities can recognize when existing procedures no longer fit the situation.

Jeneponto's event history provides evidence of temporary reconfiguration. Multi-agency rescue, evacuation, emergency distribution, and access restoration require personnel and assets to be moved from routine functions into emergency roles. These shifts demonstrate operational flexibility. However, the repeated dependence on event-specific mobilization suggests that reconfiguration is still closer to improvisation than to an institutionalized capability. Improvisation can be essential, but when every event requires actors to renegotiate roles, locate resources, and establish communication anew, response speed and consistency remain vulnerable.

The shift from flood to drought is a clear illustration. Emergency command arrangements designed for a sudden-onset hazard must be reconfigured into a longer-term service network capable of sustaining water delivery, sanitation protection, agricultural support, and social assistance. This involves different time horizons, performance indicators, and budget mechanisms. The same applies to compound flood-landslide events, where transport access, evacuation, search and rescue, and infrastructure stabilization must be managed simultaneously. A rigid organization will attempt to process these tasks through normal sectoral channels; an adaptive organization creates a temporary but pre-authorized configuration matched to the event.

Teece (2007) describes reconfiguration as the realignment of assets and organizational structures as environments change. In humanitarian organizations, dynamic capabilities similarly depend on the ability to combine emergency response with longer-term development missions and local relationships (Son et al., 2025). For local government, reconfiguration must remain accountable. This can be achieved through predefined emergency delegations, transparent thresholds for budget and personnel shifts, documented incident-command

arrangements, and rapid post-event review. Flexibility is therefore not the suspension of rules; it is the design of rules that authorize context-sensitive adjustment.

A practical reconfiguration mechanism for Jeneponto would include hazard-based operational modules. A flash-flood module would prioritize warning, evacuation, rescue, shelter, and debris clearance. A landslide module would add access control, slope assessment, heavy equipment, and alternative transport. A drought module would activate water, agriculture, health, food security, and sustained community communication. A compound-event module would establish a unified command with clearly delegated operational authority. These modules should share a common data platform and resource inventory so that they can be activated and combined without rebuilding coordination from the beginning.

A dynamic capability diagnosis

The three capabilities can be summarized as a diagnostic that distinguishes existing assets from the institutional mechanisms required to make them adaptive. Table 2 shows that Jeneponto possesses important foundations, but each capability is constrained by incomplete institutionalization. The central pattern is the gap between mobilization and continuity: actors can often be assembled during an emergency, yet the arrangements are not consistently preserved, tested, and revised across the full disaster-management cycle.

TABLE 2. DYNAMIC CAPABILITY DIAGNOSIS FOR LOCAL DISASTER GOVERNANCE IN JENEPONTO

Capability	Existing foundation	Main limitation	Institutional strengthening priority
Integrating	Multi-agency emergency response; formal lead role of BPBD; access to warning and sectoral information	Integration is strongest after an event begins; data and preventive responsibilities remain sectorally fragmented	Shared risk picture, interoperable data, hazard-specific coordination thresholds, and pre-agreed role matrices
Building	Experience from repeated disasters; formal plans and mandates; evacuation and response practices	Learning is unevenly converted into routines, budgets, institutional memory, and cross-hazard competencies	Joint after-action review, scenario exercises, modular teams, maintained resource inventories, and cross-agency knowledge retention
Reconfiguring	Temporary reassignment of personnel, logistics, and command during emergencies	Adaptation relies on ad hoc negotiation and improvisation; long-duration and compound hazards strain routine procedures	Pre-authorized delegations, flexible but accountable financing, modular operational structures, and rapid post-event correction

Toward an adaptive disaster-governance cycle

The diagnosis suggests that adaptability should be organized as a recurring governance cycle rather than as a quality expected to appear spontaneously during a crisis. The proposed cycle begins with risk sensing: combining forecasts, local observations, environmental conditions, community reports, and service data. It continues with collective interpretation, through which agencies establish a shared understanding of the threat and its likely consequences. The third stage is proportional integration, where actors and resources are assembled according to hazard type and severity rather than through a uniform roster. The fourth stage is rapid reconfiguration of authority, teams, logistics, and service priorities. The final stage is accountability-based learning, in which operational choices and results are reviewed and converted into revised plans, budgets, protocols, and training.


This cycle differs from a purely technical early-warning model. Warning information has administrative value only when the organization has agreed on who interprets it, which threshold triggers action, which resources may be shifted, and how the decision will be documented. It also differs from an ad hoc coordination model because the configuration options are prepared in advance. The purpose is not to predict every event, but to create a limited set of flexible institutional arrangements that can be combined as conditions change.

Figure 1 presents the relationship among integrating, building, and reconfiguring capability. The feedback arrow is essential. Without accountability and learning, emergency adjustments disappear when the event ends. With feedback, each event can expand institutional memory, improve the reliability of coordination, and make future reconfiguration faster. This is consistent with resilience scholarship, which treats adaptability as the capacity to adjust

responses and structures while maintaining essential functions (Walker et al., 2004; Folke et al., 2010).

The model also clarifies the role of leadership. Crisis leadership is not limited to directing operations; it includes enabling information to travel upward and laterally, protecting operational discretion, maintaining public communication, and ensuring that temporary adaptations are evaluated after the event (Boin et al., 2013). Leadership must therefore connect the formal hierarchy with networked action. Too little authority produces fragmented response, while excessive centralization can suppress local information and delay adjustment.

At the policy level, the proposed cycle requires three changes. First, local performance measures should move beyond document completeness and activity counts toward the reliability of joint action across scenarios. Second, budget design should permit rapid, transparent reallocation within predefined limits and should protect investment in preparedness, data interoperability, and maintenance. Third, institutional learning should be mandatory across agencies, with after-action findings tracked until corrective actions are implemented. These changes would turn adaptability from an informal attribute of experienced personnel into a reproducible property of the local governance system.



Picture 1. Dynamic capabilities cycle for adaptive hydrometeorological disaster governance.
Source: Author's synthesis based on Teece et al. (1997), Teece (2007), and the documentary case analysis.

CONCLUSION

Jeneponto Regency faces a hydrometeorological risk environment that shifts across sudden floods, compound flood-landslide events, and prolonged drought. This variation exposes the limitations of static administrative capacity. The local government has important foundations, including formal authority, emergency structures, operational experience, and the ability to mobilize multiple actors. However, these assets have not yet fully developed into a consistent dynamic capability.

Integrating capability is most visible during emergency mobilization but remains weakly connected across prevention, environmental management, infrastructure, water services, agriculture, and long-term recovery. Building capability occurs through experience and formal planning, yet learning is not always converted into transferable routines, cross-agency institutional memory, and scenario-based competencies. Reconfiguring capability appears in temporary shifts of personnel, logistics, and command, but it still depends heavily on ad hoc improvisation rather than pre-authorized and accountable flexibility.

The proposed adaptive disaster-governance cycle links risk sensing, collective interpretation, proportional integration, rapid reconfiguration, and accountability-based learning. Its central premise is that adaptability must be institutionalized before the next emergency. Shared data, hazard-specific operational modules, flexible financing rules, delegated authority, joint exercises, and tracked after-action corrections would allow the local government to respond differently to different hazards without sacrificing accountability.

For public administration scholarship, the case demonstrates that dynamic capabilities can explain variation in local disaster performance when they are translated from business strategy into institutionalized flexibility. For practice, it suggests that the success of disaster governance should be judged not only by the immediate response to a single event, but by whether every event makes the governance system more integrated, more knowledgeable, and faster to reconfigure.

The study contributes to dynamic capabilities research by specifying what reconfiguration means under public-law and accountability constraints. In private organizations, reconfiguration is often discussed in relation to asset portfolios and competitive performance. In local government, resources are attached to legal mandates, budget classifications, professional jurisdictions, and political responsibility. Consequently, adaptive performance depends on authorized flexibility. The most useful public-sector dynamic capability is not unlimited managerial discretion, but a transparent institutional arrangement that permits timely adjustment while retaining traceability and review.

The analysis also shows why local disaster capacity should be assessed longitudinally and across hazards. A successful evacuation in one flood is important, but it does not by itself demonstrate adaptability. Adaptability is evidenced when lessons from that event change preparedness, coordination, and resource arrangements for subsequent floods, landslides, droughts, and compound emergencies. This longitudinal view helps distinguish a capable emergency response from a local government that is continuously becoming more capable.

The study has limitations. Documentary records vary in detail and may emphasize formal actions more than informal negotiation, frontline discretion, or community perceptions. The analysis cannot establish how different actors interpret coordination problems or how political and budgetary decisions are negotiated in practice. Field interviews, observation of coordination routines, and event-based process tracing are needed to test the proposed diagnosis. Nevertheless, the documentary approach is useful for identifying institutional patterns, constructing a cross-event baseline, and preventing field analysis from being reduced to isolated perceptions.

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